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REVISITING ASHLEY X: AN ESSAY ON  
DISABLED BODILY INTEGRITY, SEXUALITY,  
DIGNITY, AND FAMILY CAREGIVING 
Julia Epstein* & Stephen A. Rosenbaum** 
Abstract: This Essay looks back on controversial medical procedures 
performed on a young girl in Seattle over a period of several years.  
Ashley X, deemed by her family one of the “Pillow Angels,” has 
significant intellectual and mobility disabilities.  She was given high 
dose estrogen treatment to attenuate her growth, a mastectomy to 
protect her from sexual assault and from the discomfort and 
sexualization of large breasts, and a hysterectomy to prevent 
menstruation and pregnancy: these interventions were also intended 
to make her more easily manageable by family members and 
caregivers so that she would be more able to be included in family life.  
Since the case became public, more children, both girls and boys, in 
the United States and around the world have undergone similar 
protocols.  The passage of time, intervening changes in the legal 
landscape, and Ashley’s transition to adulthood prompt us to ask 
questions about how parents and healthcare providers can make better 
decisions for children with disabilities without altering their bodies or 
their sexuality or reproductive capacity.  Without castigating Ashley’s 
family for their decision or rehashing the ethical and other arguments 
that have been made, we explore, from a family support and human 
rights perspective, alternatives to invasive procedures that maintain 
personal integrity and preserve dignity while also offering day-to-day 
assistance.  
 
Key words: Bodily Integrity, Cognitive Disability, Community 
Support, Developmental Disability, Dignity, Growth Attenuation, 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A little over a decade ago, in 2006, CNN publicized a clinical 
report in the Archives of Pediatric and Adolescent Medicine detailing 
the case of a child with significant developmental disabilities.1  
Identified only as Ashley X, her parents had requested, and received 
approval for, a then unknown treatment protocol intended to keep their 
daughter small and to remove her sexual and reproductive organs.2  
Doctors at Seattle Children’s Hospital removed Ashley’s uterus and 
breast buds, and administered high doses of estrogen to slow and 
ultimately stop her growth.  Other mainstream media outlets soon 
picked up the story, sparking a brief public controversy that blossomed 
into a full-fledged debate in disability and bioethics communities 
regarding the ethical, ableist,3 and legal issues underlying these 
interventions.  
Despite a subsequent ban on growth attenuation treatment 
(hereinafter “GAT”) at Seattle Children’s Hospital,4 this controversial 
 
* Former Director of Development and Communications, Disability Rights Education & 
Defense Fund (DREDF); Former Barbara Riley Levin Professor of Comparative Literature, 
Haverford College.  Epstein is the parent of an adult daughter with developmental disabilities.  
** Visiting Researcher Scholar, Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society and John & 
Elizabeth Boalt Lecturer, University of California, Berkeley; Former Staff Attorney, DREDF 
and Disability Rights California.  Rosenbaum’s son David Rafael (1986-2012) was born, and 
lived, with significant intellectual and physical disabilities.  The authors thank Evan Fuller, 
J.D., University of Washington School of Law, 2014 and Suneeta Israni, B.A., University of 
California, Berkeley, 2013 for their research and editorial suggestions on earlier drafts. 
1 We use the term “significant disabilities” interchangeably with “profound” or “severe” 
disabilities, although these words may have slightly different medical or diagnostic meanings, 
depending on the user.  On the politics of disability linguistics, see infra note 6. 
2 Daniel F. Gunther & Douglas S. Diekema, Attenuating Growth in Children with Profound 
Developmental Disability: A New Approach to an Old Dilemma, 160 ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC & 
ADOLESCENT MED. 1013 (2006).  
3 On the meaning of “ableist” and “ableism,” see, e.g., DAN GOODLEY, DIS/ABILITY 
STUDIES: THEORISING DISABLISM AND ABLEISM 21 (2014) (explaining that ableism “privileges 
able-bodiedness; promotes smooth forms of personhood and smooth health; creates space fit 
for normative citizens; encourages an institutional bias towards autonomous, independent 
bodies; and lends support to economic and material dependence on neoliberal and hyper-
capitalist forms of production”). 
4 DAVID R. CARLSON & DEBORAH A. DORFMAN, INVESTIGATIVE REPORT REGARDING THE 
“ASHLEY TREATMENT” (2007), https://www.disabilityrightswa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/ 
12/InvestigativeReportRegardingtheAshleyTreatment_May2007.pdf.  The Washington State 
Protection & Advocacy System (“WPAS”) is now known as Disability Rights Washington.  
Since 1977, the federally funded Protection and Advocacy System has been working at the 
2
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protocol5 continues to be an option elected by parents and other 
caregivers of intellectually and developmentally disabled6 children.7  It 
 
state and territorial level to protect the legal and service rights of individuals with disabilities 
“by empowering them and advocating on their behalf.”  See State Protection & Advocacy 
Systems, ADMIN. FOR COMMUNITY LIVING, https://acl.gov/programs/aging-and-disability-netw 
orks/state-protection-advocacy-systems (last modified June 25, 2018).  See also 45 C.F.R. pts. 
51 & 1326 (2018). 
5 One commentator wrote that while growth attenuation dominated the pediatricians’ 
account in defense of the surgery, and perhaps dominated the public narrative as well, a more 
accurate description of the medical protocol would have been “[a]ttenuating growth, 
involuntary sterilization, and prophylactic mastectomy in children with profound disability.”  
John Lantos, It’s Not the Growth Attenuation, It’s the Sterilization!, 10 AM. J. BIOETHICS 45, 
45 (2010).  It strikes us that “treatment” is not the appropriate term for interventions whose 
goal is to alter a body, absent medical necessity. 
6 Disability nomenclature is a minefield.  As is the case with ethnic, sexual, or other 
affiliations, identity labels change over time.  Reasonable—and even unreasonable—people 
disagree whether “disabled person” is acceptable in lieu of a “people first” term such as 
“person(s) with (a) disability” that accentuates the humanity, rather than the impairment or 
disabling condition.  Some crip activists and academics actually choose “disability first” 
language as an act of defiance or pride.  See, e.g., PAUL K. LONGMORE, WHY I BURNED MY 
BOOK AND OTHER ESSAYS ON DISABILITY 1, 14, 19, 32 (2003); Stephen A. Rosenbaum, 
Hammerin’ Hank: The Right to Be Raunchy or FM Freak Show?, 23 DISABILITY STUD. Q. _ 
nn. 51-57 (2003) (discussing naming and reclaiming of outmoded identity terms and epithets), 
http://www.dsq-sds.org/article/view/432/609.  On the art and politics of identification, see 
Stephen A. Rosenbaum, The Alien Cloak of Confidentiality: Look Who’s Wearing It Now, 4 
JOHN F. KENNEDY L. REV. 23, 24 (1991-92) (choosing commonly used terms or those that 
reflect society’s prejudice).  But see Richard Fung, Looking for My Penis: The Eroticized 
Asian in Gay Porn, in HOW DO I LOOK? QUEER FILM AND VIDEO 145, 168 (Seattle: Bay Press 
1991) (“[T]oo much time spent on the politics of ‘naming’ can in the end be diversionary.”).  
7 A recent survey by the Pediatric Endocrine Society revealed that 99% of respondents 
(mainly U.S. pediatricians) had been asked to prescribe, or had prescribed, growth attenuation 
therapy for children with severe physical and cognitive disabilities.  Allison J. Pollock, 
Norman Fost & David B. Allen, Growth Attenuation Therapy: Practice and Perspectives of 
Paediatric Endocrinologists, 100 ARCHIVES DISEASE CHILDHOOD 1185 (2015).  Results of 
another survey (New Zealand pediatricians) suggest that family requests for this treatment do 
occur and that the majority of pediatricians are not opposed to it.  Rebekah Wrigley, Nikki 
Kerrush, Paul L. Hofman, Craig Jeffries, Allison J. Pollock & Benjamin J. Wheeler, Growth 
Attenuation Therapy for Children With Severe Physical and Cognitive Disability: Practice 
and Perspectives of New Zealand Paediatricians, 53 J. PAEDIATRICS & CHILD HEALTH 1180 
(2017).  For mainstream media accounts, see Ed Pilkington & Karen McVeigh, ‘Ashley 
treatment’ on the Rise Amid Concerns From Disability Rights Groups, GUARDIAN (Mar. 15, 
2012), http://www.theguardian.com/society/2012/mar/15/ashley-treatment-rise-amid-
concerns, and for a response to this article, see Peter Singer, The ‘unnatural’ Ashley Treatment 
can be Right for Profoundly Disabled Children, GUARDIAN (Mar. 16, 2012), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/mar/16/ashley-treatment-profoundly-disa 
bled-children.  For a response to Singer, see S.E. Smith, Is the Ashley Treatment Right? Ask 
Yourself if Disabled People are Human, GUARDIAN (Mar. 16, 2012), https://www.theguardian. 
com/commentisfree/2012/mar/16/ashley-treatment-disabled-people; Genevieve Field, Should 
Parents of Children With Severe Disabilities be Allowed to Stop Their Growth?, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG. (Mar. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/magazine/should-parents-of-
severely-disabled-children-be-allowed-to-stop-their-growth.html.  
3
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is a procedure that continues to generate public debate.8  Two other 
intervening factors are worth noting: (1) the Presidential signing of the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
in 20099 and attendant questions about legal capacity;10 and (2) an 
increased preference for supported decision-making over substitute 
decision-making11 on behalf of persons with cognitive disabilities.  
Ashley is now a young adult and should enjoy a full spectrum 
of adult rights and privileges.  The passage of time, intervening 
changes in the legal landscape, and Ashley’s transition to adulthood 
prompt us to ask questions about how parents and healthcare providers 
can make better decisions for children with disabilities, which at once 
respect their dignity and allow for a future where options remain open 
 
8 See, e.g., Field, supra note 7; Julia Harris-Parker, Georgia Parents Debate Medically 
Stunting Growth of Disabled Children, AJC (Mar. 31, 2016), https://www.ajc.com/lifestyles/ 
parenting/georgia-parents-debate-medically-stunting-growth-disabled-children/RE99wfmom 
frZ0eFZ04jr5L/; Jennifer Baker, The Ashley Treatment: The Philosophy and Ethics of Growth 
Attenuation, PSYCHOL. TODAY (June 29, 2012), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/th 
e-love-wisdom/201206/the-ashley-treatment (guest column by college nursing instructor and 
lawyer Robert Newsome III in defense of the treatment); Jennifer Baker, The Case for Not 
Mutilating Your Child, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Aug. 31, 2012), https://www.psychologytoday.com/ 
us/blog/the-love-wisdom/201208/the-case-not-mutilating-your-child (guest column in 
opposition by parent dubbed “One Father’s Voracious Opinion.”). 
9 The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (hereinafter 
“Convention” or “CRPD”) was enacted on December 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3, and entered 
into force on May 3, 2008.  This treaty has been ratified or acceded to by 177 countries.  See 
UNITED NATIONS–DISABILITY, DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFF., https://www.un.org/development 
/desa/disabilities/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2019).  U.S. President Barack Obama signed it a year 
later on the 23rd anniversary of the Americans with Disabilities Act and presented it to the 
Senate for ratification.  The Heritage Foundation and Family Research Council were among 
the organizations that mounted successful opposition in 2012, arguing that the CRPD 
challenges U.S. sovereignty and strips parents of children with disabilities of their decisional 
authority.  Jasmine Harris, The Role of Support in Sexual Decision-Making for People with 
Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. FURTHERMORE 83, 90 n.35 
(2016) [hereinafter Harris, FURTHERMORE].  Whether eventually ratified or not, the 
Convention and authoritative interpretation of its articles can be used to inform U.S. legislation 
and jurisprudence under a theory of customary international law.  See, e.g., Abdullah v. Pfizer, 
Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 181 n.11 (2d. Cir. 2009) (“Khulumani makes clear that treaties that the 
United States has neither signed nor ratified—let alone treaties like the ICCPR that the United 
States has signed but not ratified—may evidence a customary international law norm for 
[Alien Tort Statute] purposes where the treaty has been ratified widely and it is clear that the 
reason for the United States’s failure to subscribe to the treaty was unrelated to the particular 
norm in question.”  See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 276, 276 n.9 (Katzmann, J., concurring).”); 
In re Mark C.H., 906 N.Y.S.2d 419, 433 (Sur. Ct. 2010) (ruling under the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties that the U.S. is obligated to “refrain from acts which would defeat [the 
Disability Convention’s] object and purpose” (alteration in original)). 
10 See infra Part IV. 
11 See infra text accompanying notes 48-53. 
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and their life paths have not been pre-determined for them by 
irreversible interventions.  
In this Essay, we situate the GAT or “Ashley Treatment,” a 
term devised by Ashley’s parents and physicians,12 in its legal and 
social context.  Our aim is not to reexamine this particular case, which 
has been amply dissected and analyzed.13  Rather, we want to examine 
how similarly situated families manage to raise children with 
significant disabilities and what questions must be raised about 
consent, autonomy, sexuality, and bodily integrity. 
In order to think through the issues raised by Ashley’s case, we 
draw from interviews with families that we conducted shortly after the 
firestorm of responses triggered by Ashley’s surgery and that we have 
since updated.14  These families have followed different paths for 
rearing children with significant disabilities.  Two of the six children 
are now teenagers, three are adults, and one has died.  By way of their 
stories, interspersed throughout this Essay, we see how families have 
managed and what they need.  By exploring these experiences, we ask 
how, as a society, we should support families like Ashley’s in ways 
that respect their children’s dignity and autonomy and do not require 
reconfiguring their children’s bodies or predetermining their physical, 
social or sexual capabilities. 
 
12 The “Ashley Treatment”: Towards a Better Quality of Life for “Pillow Angels”, 
PILLOWANGEL.ORG (Mar. 17, 2012), http://pillowangel.org/Ashley%20Treatment.pdf 
[hereinafter Ashley’s Parents’ Blog].  According to her parents, the “[a]ffectionate nickname 
for Ashley X [Pillow Angel] now generally refers to people with a physical and cognitive 
developmental level that will never exceed that of an infant’s.  Pillow Angels are entirely 
dependent on their caregivers.”  Id. at 14. 
13 See, e.g., Alicia R. Ouellette, Growth Attenuation, Parental Choice, and the Rights of 
Disabled Children: Lessons from The Ashley X Case, 8 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 207 
(2008); David B. Allen, Michael Kappy, Douglas Diekema & Norman Fost, Growth 
Attenuation Therapy: Principles for Practice, 123 PEDIATRICS 1556, 1559 (2009); Benjamin 
S. Wilfond, Paul Steven Miller, Carolyn Korfiatis, Douglas S. Diekema, Denise M. Dudzinski, 
Sara Goering & The Seattle Growth Attenuation and Ethics Working Group, Navigating 
Growth Attenuation in Children with Profound Disabilities: Children’s Interests, Family 
Decision-Making, and Community Concerns, 40 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 27 (2010); Adrienne 
Asch & Anna Stubblefield, Growth Attenuation: Good Intentions, Bad Decision, 10 AM. J. 
BIOETHICS 46 (2010); Merle Spriggs, Ashley’s Interests Were Not Violated Because She Does 
Not Have Necessary Interests, 10 AM. J. BIOETHICS 52 (2010); Timothy Lillie, What Took So 
Long?  Disability Critique Recognized, 10 AM. J. BIOETHICS 57 (2010); Peter Singer, A 
Convenient Truth, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/26/opinion/ 
26singer.html; DAVID CARLSON, CINDY SMITH, NACHAMA WILKER, DISABILITY RIGHTS 
WASHINGTON & NAT’L DISABILITY RIGHTS NETWORK, DEVALUING PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES: 
MEDICAL PROCEDURES THAT VIOLATE CIVIL RIGHTS (2012).  
14 We use pseudonyms to protect the privacy of family members and their children.  
5
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II. THE REMAKING OF ASHLEY X 
Ashley has static encephalopathy, a brain disorder of unknown 
origin that is a form of cerebral palsy.  She does not walk, talk, or care 
for herself.  When she was six-and-a half years old, her family brought 
her to the Children’s Hospital and Regional Medical Center of Seattle 
with concerns about her precocious puberty.  They worried that as she 
grew, they would no longer be able to care for her at home and to 
include her in family outings.  They also believed that menstruation 
and breasts would be detrimental to Ashley, causing her confusion and 
discomfort she would be unable to understand and sexualizing her 
body in a way that could make her vulnerable to sexual assault.15  
Ashley’s parents asked that Children’s Hospital physicians 
perform an experimental therapy on their daughter.  Working with the 
late pediatric endocrinologist Daniel Gunther, MD, who was Ashley’s 
attending physician at Children’s and an associate professor at the 
University of Washington School of Medicine, the hospital convened 
an ethics panel to consider this unprecedented request.  Ashley’s 
parents presented their reasoning before this panel, and Ashley’s 
physicians and the panel accepted the parents’ argument and began the 
protocol. 
In 2004, surgeons removed Ashley’s uterus and breast buds.  
Endocrinologists then administered high doses of estrogen to slow and 
ultimately stop her growth.  She subsequently attained her full adult 
size of 4 feet, 5 inches and 75 pounds, with no reproductive capacity 
or visible secondary sex characteristics.  Following the outpouring of 
media attention, the family posted a detailed blog to respond to the 
public controversy, and to justify what they had done.  For example, in 
the blog, her father reported:  
Ashley’s smaller and lighter size makes it more 
possible to include her in the typical family life and 
activities that provide her with needed comfort, 
closeness, security and love: meal time, car trips, touch, 
snuggles, etc.16  
 
15 Her breast buds were surgically removed so that “large breasts would not become a 
source of discomfort, particularly from the straps that held Ashley in her chair and applied 
pressure to her chest.”  Douglas S. Diekema & Norman Fost, Ashley Revisited: A Response to 
the Critics, 10 AM. J. BIOETHICS 30, 31 (2010).  
16 Ashley’s Parents’ Blog, supra note 12, at 4.  In their scathing scrutiny of the Ashley X 
affair, one scholar-blogger team wrote:  
6
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Later, her parents reiterated: 
[G]iven Ashley’s developmental state and prognosis . . 
. voluntary procreation was not applicable to her case 
and will never be.17  
Her physicians’ published report also asserted that Ashley “will 
never be capable of holding a job, establishing a romantic relationship, 
or interacting as an adult,” and concluded therefore that “it is hard to 
imagine how being smaller would be socially disadvantageous.”18  
Further, they stated that certain constitutional (reproductive) 
rights and privacy interests  
are clearly intended for those with the capacity to make 
decisions for themselves now or at some future point, 
and it is unclear how, for example, a right to make 
personal procreation choices or refuse life-sustaining 
care have any meaning in the context of someone who 
 
Ill prepared for the spotlight and intense media interest, Ashley X’s 
parents complicated matters in January of 2007 by posting a blog about 
their daughter and children like her [whom they] deemed “pillow angels.” 
It is our belief that [Dr.] Diekema, Ashley X’s parents, and proponents of 
the Ashley Treatment, now referred to as growth attenuation, are 
disingenuous. On the one hand they collectively argue the Ashley 
Treatment was about one profoundly cognitively and physically disabled 
child and yet simultaneously promote the treatment for other “pillow 
angels.” 
William J. Peace & Claire Roy, Scrutinizing Ashley X: Presumed Medical “Solutions” vs. 
Real Social Adaptation, 14 J. PHIL., SCI. & L.: DISABILITY SPECIAL ISSUE 33, 33 (2014). 
17 Ashley’s Parents’ Blog, supra note 12.  Since it was first launched, this website has been 
reduced to a few links with the family’s focus on supporting other families seeking growth 
attenuation for their children.  Many entries are no longer available for viewing. 
18 Gunther & Diekema, supra note 2, at 1016.  Much skepticism remains about the certainty 
of the medical prognosis.  One disability advocate and scholar claimed that “Diekema and 
Gunther recognized little potential for the growth and development of this child. . . . There is 
abundant evidence that all children are able to learn, that the cognitive capabilities of children 
with severe motor impairments can be grossly underestimated.”  Henry A. Bersani, Jr., Growth 
Attenuation: Unjustifiable Non-Therapy, 161 ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 
520 (2007) (alteration in original).  Philosophy professor, ethicist, and disability studies 
scholar Sara Goering commented that “even children with profound impairments develop over 
time,” that there are “stories of how [children just like Ashley have] matured in multiple ways 
. . . despite the official medical prognosis that they would remain at the cognitive level of a 6-
month-old.”  Sara Goering, Revisiting the Relevance of the Social Model of Disability, 10 AM. 
J. BIOETHICS 54, 55 (2010) (citing Eva Feder Kittay & Jeffrey Kittay, Whose Convenience? 
Whose Truth?, HASTINGS CTR. (Feb. 28, 2007), https://www.thehastingscenter.org/whose-
convenience-whose-truth/). 
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will never have the capacity to make any of these 
choices.19 
As noted previously, much has already been written about the 
bioethical and legal issues that Ashley’s case raises, and we will not 
re-examine those issues here.  Instead, we want to look beyond the 
particularities of Ashley’s case and identify how to change social 
support systems so that no family has to consider medically and 
surgically altering their child’s body. 
III. DIGNITY: PROTECTING BODILY INTEGRITY AND SEXUALITY  
We start from a basic premise that sets us in disagreement with 
the family, doctors, and healthcare systems that permitted the Ashley 
Treatment—and have permitted similar interventions for children in 
the United States, Europe, and elsewhere.20  Admittedly, the intent of 
deciding to perform a series of body-altering procedures—despite the 
absence of medical necessity—is to benefit these children and their 
families.  However, such a decision rests on the principle that 
individuals with severe cognitive impairments differ from other 
people, that their inability to make decisions for themselves—their 
inability to communicate that in turn erodes the effective possibility of 
self-determination—renders them powerless over the fate of their own 
bodies.  As a result, family members and healthcare providers, even if 
unwittingly, strip these individuals of their autonomous right to bodily 
integrity and sexuality, the loss of which leaves them less valuable as 
human beings—whether such an outcome is explicitly intended or not.  
The importance of the body has taken on new meaning since 
the dawn of the disability rights and independent living movements.  
Amongst disability studies scholars, “the body was initially perceived 
as irrelevant to an emancipatory politics.”21  Beginning with the new 
millennium, a divide developed between those who “maintained 
allegiance to more strictly sociopolitical models” of disability and 
those for whom “[b]ringing back the body into the study of disability 
was beneficial to the theorization of the dilemma of disabled 
 
19 Diekema & Fost, supra note 15, at 34 (responding to criticisms leveled in CARLSON & 
DORFMAN, supra note 4). 
20 See supra notes 7-8. 
21 Russell Shuttleworth, Nikki Wedgwood & Nathan J. Wilson, The Dilemma of Disabled 
Masculinity, 15 MEN & MASCULINITIES 174, 181 (2012). 
8
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masculinity in several important ways.”22  The body is likewise 
arguably also key to a theoretical understanding of disabled femininity 
or disabled sexuality. 
In response to the Ashley X controversy, a prominent 
bioethicist and a philosopher wrote: 
When [Doctors] Diekema and Fost argue that growth 
attenuation is morally acceptable only if it is performed 
on a child who will never know what was done, they 
are arguing, in effect, that the intervention was morally 
acceptable because Ashley’s presumed cognitive 
impairment makes her different from most people. We 
argue, in contrast, that it is unacceptable because 
Ashley is the same as most people. She is the same in 
deserving to be accepted by and respected by and loved 
by her family for who she is and what she will become, 
with no modification required.23 
Individuals with disabilities, including those with cognitive, 
intellectual, and developmental disabilities, have the same 
fundamental right to bodily integrity as does every person. We believe 
that our bodies are a part of who we are, and if we choose to change a 
body part in any way, that changes who we are.  Permanently altering 
a person’s body and body chemistry, without a rationale based on 
medical necessity, represents a disrespect for who that person is and 
constitutes a violation of their human rights and dignity.  
The saga of Ashley X demands that we question whether it is 
possible to judge a person’s ultimate potential from their situation at a 
very young age, and to consider the legal and pragmatic status of 
individuals who have profound disabilities.  Her case calls on all of us 
 
22 Id.  The “right to be left alone” is how one commentator describes “[t]he fundamental 
right to bodily integrity.” Mary Koll, Growth, Interrupted: Nontherapeutic Growth 
Attenuation, Parental Medical Decision Making, and the Profoundly Developmentally 
Disabled Child’s Right to Bodily Integrity, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV 225, 262 (2010).  It is a right 
that “fully attaches” to children with significant developmental disabilities.  Id.  
23 Asch & Stubblefield, supra note 13, at 48.  Professor Stubblefield herself became mired 
in controversy.  She lost her faculty position at Rutgers and was imprisoned for two years, 
while appealing her conviction for sexual assault against a man with significant developmental 
disabilities.  Disability and Human Sexuality scholar Kevin Mintz referenced the Stubblefield 
case in his commentary on “society’s discomfort with the notion that people with disabilities 
are sexual beings who might be appealing romantic partners to those without disabilities.”  See 
Kevin Mintz, Ableism, Ambiguity and the Anna Stubblefield Case, 32 DISABILITY & SOC’Y 
1666, 1668 (2017).  
9
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to examine our own assumptions and social strategies when we 
consider significant disabilities that include cognitive impairment and 
the interconnections—and failures to connect—between healthcare, 
community services, and family systems.  
Getting beyond “ableist normativity” is a difficult but 
fundamental leap for parents, family members, and society at large.  
Disability is a natural human condition, and how we confront it in our 
personal lives needn’t be about “fixing it” or making it conform to a 
certain aesthetic or lifestyle.24  In the words of an ethicist and Catholic 
priest:  
The Ashley case is an alarming example of parents 
presuming to hold absolute determination over their 
disabled child. The deliberation on the part of the 
parents, physicians and the ethics committee rose out of 
a conviction . . . that for Ashley’s good and the good of 
her parents, family, and future caregivers, the treatment 
was justified because Ashley was disabled.25  
It is well established that parents are legally entitled to make 
medical decisions on behalf of minor children, but it is not a right 
without limitations.26  The rationale is that a minor cannot legally or 
practically provide informed consent and, as a society, we should 
guard against foreclosing future options in the day-to-day activities, 
lifestyle, or identity for all children—no matter how “severe” their 
disability.  If there is no life-threatening circumstance, or other medical 
 
24 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 15001 (2018) (U.S. congressional finding that “disability is a 
natural part of the human experience that does not diminish the right of individuals with 
developmental disabilities to live independently, to exert control and choice over their own 
lives, and to fully participate in and contribute to their communities through full integration 
and inclusion in the economic, political, social, cultural, and educational mainstream of United 
States society.” (emphasis added)).  In Ashley’s case, it seems that “[n]o one discussed the 
ways in which human difference is valuable.” Ouellette, supra note 13, at 236-37 (citations 
omitted).  
25 Rev. Gerald D. Coleman, The Irreversible Disabling of a Child: The “Ashley Treatment”, 
7 NAT’L CATHOLIC BIOETHICS Q. 711, 723-24. (2007).  
26 Barry Lyons, The Limits of Parental Authority, 10 AM. J. BIOETHICS 50 (2010).  While a 
parent’s authority over their child should only be “subject to state interference when the harm 
done is great,” Professor Lyons argues that “we should not unquestioningly accede to parental 
decisions in the mistaken belief that parents will always do what is best for their child.  This 
is particularly so where those decisions impose a burden upon a child.”  Id. at 51.  Moreover, 
there is evidence “demonstrating the inability of parents and others without disabilities to 
comprehend the value of life with disability, or the inability of able-bodied parents to make 
truly informed decisions for their children without adequate education.”  Ouellette, supra note 
13, at 236-37 (citations omitted).   
10
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necessity, and if the medical procedure poses a serious risk to or impact 
on the bodily integrity of the child, the state has an interest in 
overseeing these decisions, generally in the form of medical 
professional judgment.  
Thus, amputation, organ removal, or chemotherapy are among 
the invasive and body altering procedures that are generally left to 
parental discretion, usually with medical advice.  The issue of parental 
convenience—harm to the child as a benefit to the parents—should not 
be the rationale for these decisions.27  As one bioethicist and jurist has 
written:  
[B]y allowing parents to subordinate their children’s 
interests to their own, the current paradigm distorts the 
parent-child relationship and objectifies children in 
violation of the moral principle, deeply embedded in 
American legal tradition, that no person, even a parent, 
may subordinate the life, liberty, or body of another for 
his or her own purposes.28 
 
27 An end-of-life determination for a critically ill child or severely disabled infant would 
also presumably fall into the category of decisions that are entrusted to parents with minimal 
intervention.  But see Craig A. Conway, Baby Doe and Beyond: Examining the Practical and 
Philosophical Influences Impacting Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of Marginally-Viable 
Newborns, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1097, 1134-35 (2009) (strong consensus in medical, legal, 
and ethical literature that best interests of the infant standard must prevail, i.e., if the burden 
on the infant is overwhelming or  prospects of survival are extremely bleak, as is the case with 
lethal abnormality, there is no obligation to subject the infant to further procedures).  
28 Alicia Ouellette, Shaping Parental Authority Over Children’s Bodies, 85 IND. L.J. 955, 
955-56 (2010).  In an earlier article, Professor Ouellette argued persuasively that “[a]n 
advocate could . . . have pointed out that the interventions would expose Ashley to what 
disability activists view as dehumanizing manipulation.”  Ouellette, supra note 13, at 238.  
“[T]o the extent the interventions impaired Ashley’s healthy bodily functions to serve third 
parties, Ashley suffered the moral harm that results when a person is denied full human 
respect.”  Id. 
11
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There is a subset of invasive medical procedures that have an 
impact on sexual liberty29 or capability,30 i.e., the sexual expression, 
activities, practices and identities that may potentially be experienced 
by disabled bodies.31  Whether to undergo these medical procedures 
should be left to the discretion of the patient, provided she has the legal 
capacity to provide informed consent.  Again, in the case of a minor, 
the surrogate decision-maker is the parent or other adult caregiver, 
subject to the same limitations noted above.32  Sexual reassignment 
 
29 The term “sexual liberty,” as used in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) concerning 
consensual sexual conduct between same-sex adults, has not really been well-defined, much 
less addressed in U.S. jurisprudence as a liberty interest held by adults with cognitive 
disabilities.  There is, however, case law that addresses the ambiguous and evolving notions 
of legal and clinical “capacity” and “competency” for disabled individuals, often in the context 
of criminal justice or civil tort litigation.  See, e.g., McManus v. Neal, 779 F.3d 634 (7th Cir. 
2015) (holding that retrospective competency hearing was not appropriate remedy for court’s 
determination that petitioner was not intellectually disabled); United States v. Christian, 749 
F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that district court abused its discretion in refusing to allow 
defendant to introduce expert testimony in support of diminished capacity defense).  In those 
instances, the judicial inquiry is usually on the safety of a disabled victim.  Disability scholars 
Tom Shakespeare, Kevin Mintz, and others refer to “sexual ableism” as the manifestation of 
lowered societal expectations for those with intellectual and other disabilities in the realm of 
sexuality and intimate relationships and suggest that it is at the root of a disproportionate 
incidence of sexual assault upon people with intellectual disability.  K.T. Mintz, “My Blessed 
Child Does Not Need to Know About That!”: How Should Sexual Health Educators Confront 
the Challenge of Religious Pluralism in Working With Individuals Who Have Intellectual 
Disabilities?, 5 ETHICS, MED. & PUB. HEALTH 8, 9-10 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jemep. 
2018.03.003.  However, sexual liberty and capability constitute more than protection against 
exploitation and assault.  
30 Professor Alexander Boni-Saenz explores the broad concept of “sexual capability” for 
persons with “persistent cognitive impairments,” i.e., “the opportunity to achieve certain states 
of being or perform certain activities associated with sexuality, such as experiencing sexual 
pleasure or forming a sexual identity.”  Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Sexuality and Incapacity, 
76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1201, 1205, 1224-30 (2015).  In her response to Boni-Saenz, Professor 
Jasmine Harris leans more directly on the CRPD model of supported decision-making and a 
recognition of universal legal capacity in the exercise of sexual capability, irrespective of the 
severity of disability.  See Harris, FURTHERMORE, supra note 9, at 83, 88-95. 
31 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, “All His Sexless Patients”: Persons with Mental Health 
Disabilities and the Competence to Have Sex, 89 WASH. L. REV. 257, 265-70 (2014) (defining 
sex as an array of practices and activities).  Professor Perlin writes: “Defining ‘sex’ is made 
more complex because, on many levels, sexuality is ‘an identity rather than [simply] an act,’” 
and “[a] person’s sexuality is often entwined with his or her gender identity.”  Id. at 265, 269 
(first alteration in original).  
32 Commentator Andrew Behrns writes: “At its constitutional core, informed consent is 
based on the rights to privacy, bodily integrity, and medical decision making.”  Andrew E. 
Behrns, To Cut Or Not To Cut?: Addressing Proposals to Ban Circumcision Under Both a 
Parental Rights Theory and Child-Centered Perspective in the Specific Context of Jewish and 
Muslim Infants, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 925, 939 (2013).  When exercised by proxy—
i.e., by a parent or guardian on behalf of an infant or minor—consent has been held to be 
tantamount to a child’s best interests test.  Id. at 940-41.  
12
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surgery,33 estrogen or testosterone therapy, sterilization and 
vasectomy, for example, all affect sexual behavior, gender expression, 
reproductive capacity, and bodily integrity—usually irreversibly.34  
But, society has little interest in regulating these decisions, if made by 
an informed adult, emancipated minor, or a “competent” youth.35  
Even if sexual activity may not be dependent on an intimate 
partner, it is important to preserve a basic human anatomical condition 
that permits sexual expression by a more mature child or young adult.  
“Some scholars argue that sexual release is as much a basic need as the 
need for sleep or food.”36  To date, the research on disability and 
 
33 To the extent that transsexuality, transgendered identity, gender fluidity, and gender 
nonconformity are accompanied by gender reassignment procedures or other significant 
alteration of the body and socio-psychological and sexual functioning, it is distinct from the 
case of Ashley X, who was below the legal age of consent to provide, with or without 
supported decision-making, reproductive or sexual alterations to her body.  The thorny issue 
of whether intersex/indeterminately-sexed infants, or infants with androgen insensitivity 
syndrome, should be raised as one gender or another, with or without surgery, in ways that 
cannot easily be turned back in adulthood, is beyond the scope of this Essay.  In Hazel Glenn 
Beh & Milton Diamond, An Emerging Ethical and Medical Dilemma: Should Physicians 
Perform Sex Assignment Surgery on Infants with Ambiguous Genitalia?, 7 MICH. J. GENDER 
& L. 1, 56-59 (2000), Professors Beh and Diamond note that “[t]he literature documenting the 
tragic aftermath of genital normalizing surgery on the intersexed identifies frank and 
unintended dangers of using irrevocable elective surgery for social reasons.”  For historical 
context, see JULIA EPSTEIN, ALTERED CONDITIONS: DISEASE, MEDICINE, AND STORYTELLING, 
ch. 4 (“Ambiguous Sexes”), 79 (1995).  
34 Female genital cutting and male circumcision also fall under the category of medical 
procedures that alter bodily integrity and sexual behavior.  Notwithstanding—and not 
discounting—cultural or religious rationales, it may be argued that these interventions should 
not be performed without consent, including proxy consent by a parent, where the alteration 
is permanent, not medically necessary, and may result in harm, including interference with 
potential sexual capability.  That debate is also beyond the scope of this Essay.  See, e.g., 
Maree Pardy, Juliet Rogers & Nan Seuffert, Perversion and Perpetration in Female Genital 
Mutilation Law: The Unmaking of Women as Bearers of Law (2019) (unpublished manuscript 
on file with authors); and Ouellette, supra note 13, at 231.  Young women with intellectual 
disabilities have also been subject to an unsavory history of non-consensual sterilization, based 
on theories tinged with eugenics, paternalism, and/or pseudo-science.  See Jasmine E. Harris, 
Sexual Consent and Disability, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 480, 510-13 (2018).  See also id. at 511 
n.125 (noting current parental argument that (voluntary) sterilization “affords greater sexual 
agency” to minors (and adults) with cognitive disabilities “who are freed from the burdens of 
reproduction and parenthood and [can still] receive the intimate connections desired”).  
35 On the authority of minors to consent to or refuse medical procedures, see, e.g., Kathryn 
Hickey, Minors’ Rights in Medical Decision Making, 9 JONA’S HEALTHCARE, L., ETHICS, & 
REGULATION 100 (2007), https://journals.lww.com/jonalaw/Abstract/2007/07000/Minors__Ri 
ghts_in_Medical_Decision_Making.13.aspx.  
36 Perlin, supra note 31, at 269 n.52 (citing Julia Bahner, Legal Rights or Simply Wishes? 
The Struggle for Sexual Recognition of People with Physical Disabilities Using Personal 
Assistance in Sweden, 30 SEXUALITY & DISABILITY 337, 340 (2012)).  For a thoughtful 
exploration of what constitutes non-procreational sexual health and intimacy for disabled 
13
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sexuality or sexual or gender identity has tended to focus on persons 
with acquired disabilities or, more generally, those with mobility or 
psycho-social impairment, whereas the sexual needs and yearnings of 
individuals with significant intellectual disabilities has received scant 
attention.37  
In examining this question, it is important to look beyond the 
case of Ashley.  Our concern is with the potential growth and 
development of any young person with a significant cognitive 
disability at the time that parents or other caregivers are entrusted with 
decisions that may have an impact on physical or sexual development.  
If these decisions are not scrutinized for the interests of the person, we 
“fall[] far short of protecting or empowering people with profound 
cognitive and physical disabilities . . . [and a] genuine commitment to 
viewing the rights of . . . all people with disabilities, regardless of 
severity—as inalienable civil rights.”38  
Despite the benefits her family believes she received, Ashley’s 
treatment left her sterilized and her body permanently altered—a 
decision reflecting an appropriation by others of Ashley’s inherent 
rights to her own bodily integrity and sexuality, thereby diminishing 
her dignity as a full human being.  In essence, our concern for 
preserving bodily integrity, sexuality, and legal personhood is about 
 
persons, see Kevin Todd Mintz, Sexual Intimacy, Social Justice, and Severe Disabilities: 
Should Fair Equality of Opportunity in Health Extend to Surrogate Partner Therapy, 14 J. 
PHIL., SCI. & L.: DISABILITY SPECIAL ISSUE 4 (2014), http://jpsl.org/files/6114/0555/6558/Inti 
macySocialJustice.pdf.  
37 Shuttleworth et al., supra note 21, at 182-84.  Based on rare and “richly contextualized 
ethnographic research in group homes for young men with significant cognitive impairments” 
conducted a few years ago, the degree to which these youths “experience a contradiction of 
expectations between being masculine and being disabled is unknown.” Id. (citing Nathan J. 
Wilson, “Conditionally Sexual”: Constructing the Sexual Health Needs of Men and Teenage 
Boys with a Moderate to Profound Intellectual Disability (unpublished doctoral thesis, Faculty 
of Medicine, University of Sydney (2009)).  Because these men were unable to participate in 
interviews, “the dilemma can only be gleaned from interviews with their caregivers. . . . It may 
well be that men with cognitive and intellectual impairments experience such a dilemma only 
minimally if at all.”  Id.   
38 Peace & Roy, supra note 16, at 40.  Co-author Claire Roy, a parent and blogger, described 
her then 20-year-old daughter Sophie as someone who shared many of Ashley’s physical and 
intellectual disabilities: “As with Ashley, how [Sophie] perceives herself, as a young woman, 
is not fully known, because she does not have the ability to express it.”  Id.  Sesha, the daughter 
of philosopher and disability studies scholar Eva Feder Kittay, “is non-verbal and cannot 
express any form of critical thought, but is able to communicate her desires to family members, 
friends, and caregivers.  She is also able to express joy and affection in a way that reciprocates 
the love and care that she receives from those around her.”  K.T. Mintz, supra note 29, at 4 
(citation omitted). 
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preserving dignity.39  “The fact that an infant cannot articulate her 
dignity is irrelevant.  The intrinsic value and the rights of a human 
being are not qualified by a person’s intelligence or physical 
capabilities.”40  
IV. LEGAL CAPACITY: ADDED DIMENSIONS FROM UNITED 
NATIONS CONVENTION  
The debate over the capacity of persons with profound 
intellectual or developmental disabilities to control their bodies and 
their lives has become more complicated since the adoption of the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, with its 
controversial article on legal capacity.41  Simply put, under Article 12, 
people with disabilities enjoy legal capacity—capacity for rights and 
capacity to act—on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life.42  
 
39 For an extensive discussion of dignity in the mental disability context, see Jonathan 
Simon & Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Dignifying Madness: Rethinking Commitment Law in an 
Age of Mass Incarceration, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 21-25 (2015) (reviewing ancient and post-
Holocaust emergence of pragmatic doctrine of dignity, based on five core meanings and 
informed by human rights practice).  There is no reason to restrict the analysis to individuals 
with mental health disabilities.  Other discussions of dignity and human rights with respect to 
growth attenuation can be found in Peace & Roy, supra note 16; Caroline Harnacke, The 
Ashley Treatment: Improving Quality of Life or Infringing Dignity and Rights?, 30 BIOETHICS 
3 (2015); and Adam Cureton & Anita Silvers, Respecting the Dignity of Children with 
Disabilities in Clinical Practice, 29 HEC F. 257 (2017). 
40 Coleman, supra note 25, at 724. 
41 The controversy is manifested in part by the high number of treaty reservations, 
understandings, and declarations that have been lodged by states-parties.  See UNITED 
NATIONS–DISABILITY, supra note 9.  Much ink has been spilled—and keyboard text 
manipulated—over Article 12 since the CRPD entered into force.  See, e.g., Amita Dhanda, 
Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights Convention: Stranglehold of the Past or Lodestar of 
the Future?, 34 SYR. J. INT’L L. & COM. 429 (2007); Gerard Quinn, A Short Guide to the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, in 1 EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF 
DISABILITY LAW (Gerard Quinn & Lisa Waddington eds., 2009); Shirli Werner, Individuals 
with Intellectual Disabilities: A Review of the Literature on Decision-Making Since the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), 34 PUB. HEALTH REV. 1, 16 
(2012); Lucy Series, Relationships, Autonomy and Legal Capacity: Mental Capacity and 
Support Mechanisms, 40 INT’L J.L. PSYCHIATRY 80 (2015); Piers Gooding, Navigating the 
‘Flashing Amber Lights’ of the Right to Legal Capacity in the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Responding to Major Concerns, 15 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
45 (2015). 
42 Article 12 states, in pertinent part:  
1. States Parties reaffirm that persons with disabilities have the right to 
recognition everywhere as persons before the law. 
2. States Parties shall recognize that persons with disabilities enjoy legal 
capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life. 
15
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States have a duty to provide persons with disabilities access to the 
supports they may require to exercise their legal capacity and ensure 
that these measures provide for safeguards to prevent abuse that are 
both proportional and tailored to the individual’s circumstances.  These 
safeguards:  
shall ensure that measures relating to the exercise of 
legal capacity respect the rights, will and preferences of 
the person, are free of conflict of interest and undue 
influence, are proportional and tailored to the person’s 
circumstances, apply for the shortest time possible and 
are subject to regular review by a competent, 
independent and impartial authority or judicial body.43 
In a meticulously researched text on legal capacity, disability 
scholar Anna Arstein-Kerslake discusses at length the importance of 
decision-making and the ways in which it is still denied to people with 
cognitive disability.44  The academician and advocate, who was 
influential in the U.N. convention monitoring the committee’s 
adoption of a General Comment,45 is primarily concerned with 
 
3. States Parties shall take appropriate measures to provide access by 
persons with disabilities to the support they may require in exercising their 
legal capacity. 
For access to the CRPD Articles, see CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH 
DISABILITIES–ARTICLES, https://www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/convention-on-th 
e-rights-of-persons-with-disabilities/convention-on-the-rights-of-persons-with-disabilities-
2.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2019). 
43 CRPD, supra note 42, at art. 12(4).  An additional subsection requires that state parties 
ensure equality in disabled persons’ ownership, inheritance, and disposition of property, 
control of their financial affairs, and access to credit.  Id. at art. 12(5).  
44 See ANNA ARSTEIN-KERSLAKE, RESTORING VOICE TO PEOPLE WITH COGNITIVE 
DISABILITIES: REALIZING THE RIGHT TO EQUAL RECOGNITION BEFORE THE LAW (2017).  Dr. 
Arstein-Kerslake is a senior lecturer at Melbourne University’s law school and Convenor of 
the University’s Disability Research Initiative.  While debate remains amongst CRPD 
signatories about their interpretation of Article 12, there is general consensus on these core 
elements: recognition of legal capacity for everyone on an equal basis; primacy of an 
individual’s will and preferences, establishment of adequate safeguards, and replacement of 
substitute decision-making systems with supported decision-making systems.  Id. at 73. 
45 Anna Arstein-Kerslake & Eilionóir Flynn, The General Comment on Article 12 of the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: A Roadmap for Equality Before the 
Law, 20 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 471 (2016).  Human rights monitoring bodies, such as the CRPD 
Committee, adopt General Comments when there is concern about States Parties 
misinterpreting, or giving insufficient attention to, certain areas of human rights law.  The 
comments are not legally binding, but are considered an authoritative interpretation.  ARSTEIN-
KERSLAKE, supra note 44, at 27.  Dr. Flynn is Director of the Centre for Disability Law and 
Policy at the National University of Ireland-Galway. 
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determining what decisions constitute “legal agency,” as this is central 
to the definition of legal capacity.  While all human beings have the 
potential to exercise legal agency, irrespective of the significance or 
complexity of their disability,46 it does require “an element of 
intention.”47  
One such measure for exercising legal capacity is Supported 
Decision-Making (hereinafter “SDM”).  Cherished in the disability 
community as the antidote to guardianship and other antiquated 
frameworks for governing the lives of people with mental health, 
psycho-social, and intellectual disabilities, SDM “reflects a significant 
normative shift in the structure of Anglo-American conceptions of 
legal rights and responsibilities, yet, in the spirit of legal realism, better 
reflects the everyday decision-making of people with and without 
disabilities.”48  This shift from making substituted to supported 
decisions means that legally recognized decisions move from the 
individual to a family member or designated others.  
There are four recognized principles for safeguarding 
supported decision-making: Both parties are respected as legal agents 
with full personhood; the power or dependency imbalance does not 
result in domination by the support person; the product of the 
relationship is an expression of the will and preferences of the person 
with cognitive disability; and the SDM system does not overregulate 
the lives of persons with disability.49 
A well-known disability rights scholar and advocate offers this 
succinct definition: 
[A] series of relationships, practices, arrangements, and 
agreements, of more or less formality and intensity, 
designed to assist an individual with a disability to 
make and communicate to others decisions about the 
individual’s life.50 
 
46 See Eilionóir Flynn & Anna Arstein-Kerslake, Legislating Personhood: Realizing the 
Right to Support in Exercising Legal Capacity, 10 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 81 (2014). 
47 Intention may be broadly and presumptively manifested by any indication of purpose and 
deliberation behind an action, decision or omission.  ARSTEIN-KERSLAKE, supra note 44, at 
149-50.  For purposes of Article 12, Arstein-Kerslake and Flynn make “an assumption . . . in 
favour of finding intention—and therefore ascribing legal agency,” id. at 150 (emphasis 
added), or “universal legal capacity.”  Id. at 29. 
48 Harris, FURTHERMORE, supra note 9, at 94. 
49 ARSTEIN-KERSLAKE, supra note 44, at 190. 
50 Robert D. Dinerstein, Implementing Legal Capacity Under Article 12 of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: The Difficult Road from Guardianship 
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There is a particularly fine line between substituted and 
supported decision-making for persons, like Ashley, who are non-
verbal, minimally communicative, and/or have complex disability.51 
Moreover, “a preference for autonomy above all other rights and needs 
of the individual” is not the solution to attaining recognition of legal 
capacity, but must be reconciled with a panoply of other human 
rights.52 In the end, the recognition of legal capacity and equal 
treatment for all people with cognitive disabilities, with the requisite 
decision-making support, may be more about human dignity than any 
other right or consideration.53  
V. CHILD-REARING AND THE SOCIAL MODEL OF DISABILITY  
Almost two decades into the 21st century, it should be 
acknowledged that the social model of disability has supplanted the 
medical model, although much education remains to be done on this 
fundamental concept—for policy makers and the public at large.  
Unlike its antecedent, the social model views disability as caused by 
society and an environment that creates disabling barriers, rather than 
by a physical or mental impairment that needs to be treated, cured, or 
rehabilitated.  Its focus is on society rather than the individual.54  It 
 
to Supported Decision-Making, 19 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 8, 10 (2012).  Professor Dinerstein notes 
that “th[e] use of the word ‘support,’ and the related concept of supported decision-making, 
represents nothing less than a ‘paradigm shift’ away from well-established but increasingly 
discredited notions of substituted decision making.”  Id. at 8.  For an overview of SDM, see 
Harris, FURTHERMORE, supra note 9, at 86-93; and Piers Gooding, Supported Decision-
Making: A Rights-Based Disability Concept and Its Implementation for Mental Health Law, 
20 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 431 (2013). 
51 One group opposes the position of the CRPD Committee, which takes a dim view of any 
form of proxy or surrogate decision-making.  This camp asserts that there must always be a 
legal option for substituted decision-making, with a regulated standard, although unclear what 
that standard is.  The “abolitionist” camp, on the other hand, “argues equally adamantly” that 
to permit any substituted decision-making is an Article 12 violation.  ARSTEIN-KERSLAKE, 
supra note 44, at 75.  In fact, the Committee’s position may not be absolutist, given the 
guidance provided in the General Comment on replacing substituted decision-making 
“regimes” with SDM.  Id. at 64-75. 
52 ARSTEIN-KERSLAKE, supra note 44, at 181. 
53 See, e.g., Simon & Rosenbaum, supra note 39, at 38 (discussing how individual 
autonomy and respect for inherent dignity are as essential to people with mental disabilities as 
enjoyment of internationally recognized human rights).  
54 See ARSTEIN-KERSLAKE, supra note 44, at 71; THERESIA DEGENER, A HUMAN RIGHTS 
MODEL OF DISABILITY 3-5 (2014), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/283713863.  The 
social model “does not disavow medical treatment or interaction with medical professionals,” 
a position on professional judgment that many of our peers might not share.  Prominent 
disability civil rights attorney Arlene Mayerson, our former DREDF colleague, reminded one 
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asks that professionals not provide treatment or care “through the lens 
of a diagnosis or disability,” but based on what individuals want for 
themselves, in order to overcome “a potentially unbending social or 
physical environment.”  CRPD Committee Chair Theresia Degener, 
however, posits that a human rights model55 is now the favored 
framework for addressing disability.56  
The fact that families like Ashley’s feel the need to consider 
resorting to radical alteration of their children’s bodies in order to care 
for them at home or to provide them with a safe and fulfilling life in 
their community speaks loudly to the inadequacies of our social care 
system.  The Ashley X case raises several complex questions: how 
does our society view people with severe disabilities?  What methods 
have individual families found to cope with their caregiving 
responsibilities and challenges?  What social supports are necessary 
for people with intellectual and developmental disabilities and their 
families to thrive without invasive body alterations?  
Beyond the law, philosophy, and ethics lie the practical 
questions of how we manage the hard work—physical, cognitive, and 
 
of us a few years ago that “the Independent Living Movement was fueled in large part by a 
rejection of professional control over disabled lives.”  Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Une Procédure 
en Difficulté: A Blueprint for Resolving “Special” Education Disputes through a Quasi-
Inquisitorial Process, 32 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUSTICE/RECUEIL ANNUEL DE WINDSOR 
D’ACCÈS À LA JUSTICE 115, 130 n.72 (2015).  Similarly, Professor Harris calls attention to the 
“privileging of medical expertise” in the assessment (and identification) of disability.  See 
Harris, Sexual Consent, supra note 34, at 518 & 519 n.161 (reflecting “deeply-rooted history 
of pathologizing non-normative differences that cut across race, class, gender, and sexual 
identity”).  See also Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the “Experts”: From Deference to 
Abdication under the Professional Judgment Standard, 102 YALE L.J. 639, 680, 691 (1992) 
(disabled person’s “voice is so completely silenced” vis-à-vis the professional’s). 
55 For an introduction to the human rights model of disability, see Gerard Quinn and 
Theresia Degener, A Survey of International, Comparative and Regional Disability Law 
Reform, in DISABILITY RIGHTS LAW AND POLICY 13 (Mary Lou Breslin and Silvia Yee eds., 
2002).  In A Human Rights Model of Disability, supra note 54, Degener, who is also outgoing 
chair of the CRPD Committee, lists distinctions between the human rights and social models.  
The latter’s “sociological explanation of disability may lay the foundation for a social theory 
of disability,” according to Professor Degener, but it does not provide foundational moral 
principles or values, such as the human rights and fundamental freedoms that are articulated 
in the disability rights convention.  Id. at 7.  
56 Degener notes that one of the social model’s founding fathers, Michael Oliver, has called 
for a halt to the strong criticism of this model by disability studies scholars “unless someone 
can come up with an alternative.”  DEGENER, supra note 54, at 3.  She asserts that the human 
rights model as embodied in the disability convention is just such an alternative.  Id.  
“[W]hereas the social model merely explains disability, the human rights model encompasses 
the values for disability policy that acknowledge[] the human dignity of disabled persons.  
Only the human rights model can explain why human rights do not require absence of 
impairment.”  Id. at 6.  
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emotional—of raising children.  That reconstructing their bodies even 
surfaces as a solution testifies to the shortcomings of our social care 
system.  
Aaron’s Story 
Aaron was Ellen and Michael Zafrani’s first child, and endless 
days in the intensive care neo-natal nursery followed his birth in 
California.  The treating neonatologist at the Kaiser HMO Medical 
Center gave a prognosis early on that rings in his parents’ ears to this 
day: The developmental delay “could range from being a B+ student 
in school to profound physical disability and mental retardation.”  
Michael later recounted that, “we didn’t fully realize that ‘delay’ can 
also mean ‘never catching up.’”  The hospital social worker referred 
the Zafranis to the local Regional Center,57 while Michael and Ellen’s 
parents overwhelmed the couple with outdated notions of how to care 
for a child with “birth defects” and brought up the topic of 
“placement” options. 
Aaron’s challenges tested the Zafranis’ resolve as parents and 
as a couple.  Michael recalls his anger and frustration rising to the 
point that after countless visits to the HMO, he shouted “Fuck 
Kaiser!” on one occasion to anyone within earshot of the waiting room 
receptionist.  Interactions with Aaron were never just about play; there 
was always a therapeutic component.  A Parent Infant Program at 
Children’s Hospital, however, was a safe space to play with Aaron 
without pitying glances or curious gazes from other parents.  They took 
refuge among Aaron’s developmentally disabled peers and their 
parents.  
Things got a bit easier once Aaron began school, by which time 
it was clear he was not going to be a B+ student.  Ellen and Michael 
were surprised at the school district’s decision to place Aaron in 
 
57 The 21 California regional centers are quasi-public clearinghouse agencies that “provide 
fixed points of contact in the community” for developmentally disabled persons and their 
families, so that they have access to “the services and supports best suited to them throughout 
their lifetime.”  CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 4620(a) (2018).  Reflecting a skepticism of 
government and/or privileging of the non-governmental sector, the California Legislature 
issued a finding that “the service provided to individuals and their families by regional centers 
is of such a special and unique nature that it cannot be satisfactorily provided by state agencies.  
Therefore, private nonprofit community agencies shall be utilized by the state for the purpose 
of operating regional centers.”  Id. § 4620(b).  See also infra Parts VI-VIII. 
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“inclusive” classrooms for his preschool and elementary years.58  
They knew that inclusion was an option for “higher functioning” 
children with more moderate disabilities.  Nonetheless, they eagerly 
embraced the recommendation.  Two younger siblings had now joined 
the household.  The Zafranis qualified for Regional Center vendor-
provided respite care, a service for which the eligibility guidelines 
were not transparent.59  It also entailed scheduling difficulties, training 
each new caregiver, and worrying if the caregiver would show up. 
Wanting to make sure their younger children also got adequate 
attention and feeling that they did not have the patience or physical 
endurance to meet all of Aaron’s needs, Ellen and Michael began to 
look for alternatives.  First, Aaron spent weekends in a family care 
home.  Then Ellen and Michael founded a non-profit corporation to 
establish a small licensed home in their community where Aaron could 
have the company of peers and round-the-clock caregivers.  The 
Zafranis monitored the quality of care and did fundraising to 
supplement the inadequate Medicaid60 allocations for each resident;  
this solution was also labor-intensive.  With ardent advocacy61 by his 
parents, Aaron continued to receive 1:1 support for community-based 
 
58 The word “inclusion” never actually appears in the text of the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).  The statutory term of art, “least restrictive environment” 
(LRE), is shorthand for the federal mandate that “[t]o the maximum extent appropriate, 
children with disabilities . . . are [to be] educated with children who are not disabled.”  20 
U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2018); 34 C.F.R. § 300.550 (2018).  But see CPRD, supra note 42, at 
art. 24(1)-(2) (“States Parties shall ensure an inclusive education system at all levels and 
lifelong learning [and] that . . . [p]ersons with disabilities can access an inclusive, quality and 
free primary education and secondary education on an equal basis with others in the 
communities in which they live.”).  
59 In-home respite services or “intermittent or regularly scheduled temporary non-medical 
care and supervision” are designed to help keep at home a disabled child with high needs and 
to relieve family members from “the constantly demanding responsibility” of attending to the 
individual’s “basic self-help needs and other activities of daily living.”  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 
17, § 54302(a)(38) (2018).  The stresses faced by parents, siblings, or other family members 
who engage in care or support may indeed be substantial and are not easily alleviated by extra 
hours of respite care.  Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Representing David: When Best Practices 
Aren’t and Natural Supports Really Are, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 161, 169 (2007). 
60 “Medicaid provides health coverage to millions of Americans, including eligible low-
income children and people with disabilities.  The program is funded jointly by the states and 
federal government.”  Medicaid, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.medi 
caid.gov/medicaid/index.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2019). 
61 The expectation that “parents and guardians will not lack ardor” in making sure their 
disabled children receive all the benefits to which they are entitled under law was articulated 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in its initial review of the IDEA, the nation’s decades-old special 
education law.  Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 
209 (1982).  
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activities from East Bay Innovations (EBI), a non-profit agency that 
provides independent living, supported living, and employment 
services.62  There was never serious consideration by Aaron’s parents 
of how he might attain any degree of intimacy or sexual pleasure after 
reaching adulthood. It simply was not on the menu of options, although 
Michael was familiar with the literature and controversy about 
facilitating sexual activity in adult institutional settings for persons 
with cognitive disabilities. 
Even with this elaborate support system, challenges persisted 
in attending to Aaron’s physical care and enjoyment.  His non-
motorized wheelchair became difficult to maneuver after he developed 
scoliosis, and his health required special skills to manage.  Aaron died 
suddenly in 2012, at age 25, from health complications not directly 
related to his disability. 
VI. MANDATE FOR COMMUNITY-BASED LIVING AND SUPPORT 
Rectifying the lack of meaningful resources and care for 
families with disabled children is no easy task.  However, some states 
have successfully enacted ambitious and comprehensive legislation to 
address these problems.  California’s landmark Lanterman Act 
provides a model for how states can use public policy initiatives to 
establish supports and services that permit families to raise children 
with disabilities so that they achieve their maximum potential.  
California is the only state that provides entitlement-based services for 
people with at least some types of developmental disability.  On its 
face, the statute explicitly recognizes that “the mere existence or the 
delivery of services and supports is, in itself, insufficient evidence of 
program effectiveness.”63  And, like all bureaucracies, California’s 
 
62 EAST BAY INNOVATIONS, HTTPS://WWW.EASTBAYINNOVATIONS.ORG (LAST VISITED Feb. 
20, 2019).  EBI’s mission is “[t]o arrange and provide personalized support that enables 
individuals with disabilities to live in their own homes, work in jobs of their choosing, and 
feel a sense of membership in their community.”  About, EAST BAY INNOVATIONS, 
https://www.eastbayinnovations.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2019).  
63 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 4501.  The legislative intent further states that “agencies 
serving persons with developmental disabilities shall produce evidence that their services have 
resulted in consumer or family empowerment and in more independent, productive, and 
normal lives for the persons served.”  Id. 
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developmental disability infrastructure demands concerted and 
indefatigable advocacy.64 
The California Legislature adopted the Developmental 
Disabilities Act or “Lanterman Act” in 1977.65  This nationally 
renowned legislation affords Californians with developmental 
disabilities the right “to make choices in their own lives.”66  The statute 
accomplishes this with the aid of a network of service centers that 
contract with the state to implement an Individual Program Plan 
(“IPP”) for each “consumer.”67  A team of family members, therapists, 
other caregivers, service providers, and agency representatives join a 
team that, together with the consumer, determines the necessary 
services and supports, based on  the latter’s “needs and preferences” 
or, “when appropriate,” those of her family.68  Services and supports—
not cash benefits—are directed toward  social, personal, physical, or 
economic habilitation or rehabilitation or “the achievement and 
maintenance of independent, productive, normal lives.”69 
 
64 On the theory behind the Lanterman Act and particularized implementation by the 
Department of Developmental Services (DDS) and the network of regional centers, vendors, 
and offices of Client Rights Advocates, see generally Rosenbaum, supra note 59. 
65 Assemb. 846, Stats. 1977, c. 1252, p. 4521, § 550 (1977); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 
4500 et seq. (2018).  The precursor statute adopted in 1969 was dubbed the Lanterman Mental 
Retardation Services Act, named for visionary Republican Assembly Member Frank D. 
Lanterman.  Developmental disability is defined as “a disability that originates before an 
individual attains 18 years of age; continues, or can be expected to continue, indefinitely; and 
. . . shall include intellectual disability, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, and autism.”  Id. § 4512(a).  
The term also includes disabling conditions closely related to intellectual disability or 
requiring treatment similar to that required for intellectually disabled persons.  Id.  
66 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 4501 reads in relevant part: “Services and supports should 
be available to enable persons with developmental disabilities to approximate the pattern of 
everyday living available to people without disabilities of the same age.”  These individuals 
“and where appropriate, their parents, legal guardian, or conservator, should be empowered to 
make choices in all life areas. . . . The contributions made by parents and family members . . . 
are important and those relationships should also be respected and fostered, to the maximum 
extent feasible” allowing disabled persons and their families to “build circles of support within 
the community.”  Id. 
67 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 4512(b).  “Consumer” is the current statutory term of art for 
individuals with developmental disabilities who qualify for regional center services and 
supports in this “cradle to grave” system.  Sometimes they are referred to as regional center 
“clients” who are assigned to service providers or case managers.  Several years ago, a badge 
surfaced among advocates and activists who did battle with the DDS bureaucracy.  It read: “I 
am not a ‘case’ and I don’t need to be ‘managed.’” 
68 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 4646.  See also DISABILITY RIGHTS CAL., INDIVIDUALIZED 
PROGRAM PLAN (IPP) PLANNING GUIDE (2016), https://www.disabilityrightsca.org/system/file 
s/file-attachments/503801.pdf. 
69 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 4512(b).  It is beyond the scope of this Essay to examine 
other national “womb to tomb” support schemes for persons with intellectual or other complex 
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In ways that reflect the spirit of Article 12, the Lanterman Act 
is filled with mandates for services and parental and consumer rights: 
all agencies receiving state funds shall respect consumer choice and 
provide “opportunities to exercise decision making skills in any aspect 
of day-to-day living.”70  In explicit terms, the Lanterman Act aims to 
achieve several positive outcomes: for example, children should live 
at home with their parents, and adults with disabilities should have 
“supported living” arrangement options “with support available as 
often and for as long as it is needed.”71  State-provided services also 
help regional center adult consumers choose “where and with whom 
to live; and control[] the character and appearance of the environment 
within their home” and enable them to “[m]ake fundamental life 
decisions.”72  
This entitlement legislation resulted from many years of 
parental activism and lobbying.  The text is well crafted, and the courts 
have interpreted its language favorably.  In an instrumental decision, 
the California Supreme Court held that the Legislature has enacted: 
a comprehensive statutory scheme . . . to provide a 
“pattern of facilities and services . . . sufficiently 
complete to meet the needs of each person with 
developmental disabilities . . . [and] to enable them to 
 
disability and their families.  It is worth noting, however, that there are deeper policy roots in 
other countries.  For example, Sweden’s Committee for the Partially Able-Bodied articulated 
in 1946 an expectation that organizing services for disabled persons should bring about “a 
‘normalization’ of conditions of life.”  EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY RESEARCH 
NETWORK, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY IN EUROPE: WORKING PAPERS 54 (2003), 
http://www.enil.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Intellectual-Disability-in-Europe.pdf.  This 
policy, the product of a postwar social welfare state, burgeoning human rights doctrine, 
deinstitutionalization movement, and economic incentives, was eventually extended to 
persons with more significant disabilities and “oriented towards giving the family support, in 
order to be able to live with its child at home during infancy and school years.  When it 
becomes an adult, the family has become older and no longer able to give its support, the 
person gets the possibility to establish his own adult life.”  Id. at 57.  Shortly thereafter, in 
1958, a parents’ association Lebenshilfe was founded in (West) Germany, maintaining that 
“services for intellectually disabled people should be family-oriented until adulthood when 
they should take into account the separation of the living areas of home, work and recreation.”  
Id. at 15.  This right to early support “anchored in law” rose from the ashes of the genocidal 
regime of the Third Reich and eventually culminated in family-support services on a broad 
basis by the 1970s.  Id. at 16. 
70 Id. § 4512.1.  These are the quotidian decisions that may not rise to the level of legal 
agency under Article 12, but are nonetheless “intricately tied to our personhood and the 
construction of our individual personalities.”  ARSTEIN-KERSLAKE, supra note 44, at 148. 
71 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 58614(a)(1) (2018). 
72 Id. § 58614(a)(2). 
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approximate the pattern of everyday living of 
nondisabled persons of the same age and to lead more 
independent and productive lives in the community.73  
Carol’s Story 
After a bout with pneumonia before her first birthday, Carol 
Larsen was diagnosed with cystic fibrosis, and with cerebral palsy six 
months later.  Her father, Max, built a special frame for changing 
Carol’s diapers while she was in a full body cast.  Max also 
constructed an adaptive walker, because Carol didn’t begin to walk 
until she was nearly 5 years old, and he renovated their house so she 
could get around. 
In the meantime, Carol’s mother, Diana, built a support system 
for the family.  She put Carol in a county-run early intervention 
nursery program designated for children with severe disabilities.  This 
was before the passage of Section 50474 and IDEA75 and was forward-
looking for the era.  Despite having few financial resources, Diana 
became one of her region’s most knowledgeable and effective 
advocates for children with disabilities, and the Larsens received the 
full range of services available because Diana learned to use Regional 
 
73 Ass’n for Retarded Citizens (ARC) v. Dep’t of Developmental Servs., 696 P.2d 150 (Cal. 
1985).  The statute’s lofty language, however, does not necessarily translate into legal 
enforcement, as the mandate for supports and services is subject to the Legislature’s 
appropriation of funds.  In recent years, the Lanterman Act was amended, presumably due to 
the augmenting cost and number of potentially qualifying beneficiaries, to require that the 
disability be deemed as substantial, i.e., “a major impairment of cognitive and/or social 
functioning.”  Id. § 4512(a); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. § 54001 (2018).  On the Act’s fiscal and 
other limitations, see Rosenbaum, supra note 59, at 173-74 (observing how state 
reimbursement rates to service providers do not keep pace with real world wages and 
operational costs).  On unfunded mandates generally, see, e.g.,  Sch. Dist. of City of Pontiac 
v. Sec. of U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 512 F.3d 252 (6th Cir. 2008) (discussing unfunded mandates 
for No Child Left Behind Act); Connecticut v. Duncan, 612 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2010) (same); 
and Breitenfeld v. Sch. Dist. of Clayton, 399 S.W.3d 816 (Mo. 2013) (discussing Missouri’s 
Unaccredited District Tuition Statute).  
74 Under Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, § 504.  Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 
(1973), 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796l:  
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . 
. shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or 
under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by 
the United States Postal Service. 
29 U.S.C. § 794 (2018). 
75 See supra note 58.  
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Center and In Home Supportive Services (IHSS)76 to obtain respite 
care and financial help.  The family had medical insurance, and Carol 
now has financial support from Supplemental Security Income (SSI)77 
and State Supplemental Security Disability Income (SSDI)78 as well as 
Medicare and Medicaid.  
By late elementary school, Carol’s older sister Stephanie 
routinely met Carol at the bus stop after school and watched her until 
their parents got home from work.  This was not easy, and Stephanie 
admits to having felt some resentment while growing up.  She avoided 
having friends over because it was embarrassing to have to explain 
her sister to them.  Stephanie herself, tellingly, became an attorney 
specializing in disability law and is active in the disability rights 
community. 
Now in her late 40s, Carol lives with a disabled roommate in a 
24/7 supported living apartment, supervised by East Bay Innovations.  
For many years, Carol attended a non-profit adult day program and 
volunteered in the community, with support from an agency service 
provider.  Her health has begun to decline over the past several years.  
She now uses supplemental oxygen and, having developed diabetes, 
she is insulin-dependent and her diet is monitored closely.  Despite 
these health challenges, Carol continues to live an active and happy 
life with a loving family and a supportive community. 
VII. COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY 
The significance of the Lanterman Act’s community-centric 
approach cannot be overstated.  In nearly all the personal narratives we 
include in this Essay, parents talk about the importance of having a 
 
76 California’s IHSS Program pays for services to allow persons, including disabled 
children, to “remain safely in [their] own home . . . .”  Services include: housecleaning, meal 
preparation, laundry, grocery shopping, personal hygienic care, and paramedical services, and 
protective supervision for persons with mental disabilities.  In-Home Supportive Services 
(IHSS) Program, CAL. DEP’T SOC. SERVICES, http://www.cdss.ca.gov/In-Home-Supportive-
Services (last visited Feb. 20, 2019). 
77 SSI (Title XVI) is a federal cash assistance program funded by general tax revenues to 
help low-income aged, blind, and disabled people meet basic needs for food, clothing, and 
shelter.  Supplemental Security Income Home Page—2018 Edition, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., 
https://www.ssa.gov/ssi/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2019).  
78 To qualify, SSDI recipients must first have worked in jobs covered by Social Security 
(Title II) and have a medical or disabling condition and are therefore unable to work, in 
general, for a year or more.  SSDI: The Details, DISABILITY BENEFITS 101, 
https://ca.db101.org/ca/programs/income_support/ssdi/program2.htm (last updated Feb. 11, 
2019). 
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community of support—not only for their children, but also for their 
own personal and emotional well-being.  From the Zafranis’ parent-
infant play group to Carol’s supported living residence for adults, the 
lives of disabled people and their families quickly come to depend on 
the communities of support created by the Lanterman Act and other 
related programs and organizations. 
Moreover, these communities provide a safe and inclusive 
environment for individuals with disabilities to develop physically, 
cognitively, and emotionally.  Respecting the dignity of others means 
taking them seriously as who they are.  A child is going to grow into 
adolescence and then adulthood.  Teenagers with developmental 
disabilities are still teenagers, and adults with developmental 
anomalies are still adults.  
Family members provide the most obvious form of “natural 
support,” and where family is not an option, friends and the community 
can fulfill that role.79  The statute characterizes natural supports as 
those “personal associations and relationships typically developed in 
the community that enhance the quality and security of life” for 
disabled individuals.80  This includes family, as well as friends, fellow 
students, co-workers, and relationships developed through 
organizational or civic participation.81  The Lanterman Act advances 
the support concept even further in what may be construed as 
California’s version of Supported Decision-Making. The so-called 
“circle of support” is “a committed group” of mostly volunteers, 
including family and/or community members, who meet regularly “to 
share experiences, promote autonomy and community involvement, 
and assist the individual in establishing and maintaining natural 
supports.”82  
The circle of support model is consistent with CRPD Article 12 
insofar as it rejects liberal political theory’s notion of the individual as 
a “rational man, walking alone through the world” in favor of a rights 
 
79 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 4512(e).  
80 Id.  Interestingly, the definition under state regulations is slightly different: “relationships 
typically developed in the family and community.”  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 54302(a)(48) 
(emphasis added).  “No doubt someone somewhere is defending a dissertation in which these 
nuanced forms of support are discussed and deconstructed.”  Rosenbaum, supra note 59, at 
177 n.48.  
81 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 4512(e).  
82 Id. § 4512(f).  The regulations further provide that this “informal but identifiable and 
reliable group of people . . . meet and communicate regularly to offer support, at a frequency 
and in a manner consistent with and appropriate to the need, to the consumer for whose benefit 
it exists.”  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 58601(a)(1).  
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holder legal scheme in which the individual “exercises her liberty 
through her social connections.”83  This change in thinking may be 
attributed to feminist scholars who have “pointed out the fallacy of the 
isolated autonomous man . . . instead highlight[ing] the 
interdependence of every individual.”84  Notably, “[s]ome individuals 
use social support more than others, but no one is free from the web of 
familial and social structures that make up our communities.”85  
Recognition of interpersonal relationships and mutual dependencies 
should not detract from the notion of individual autonomy, but these 
relationships and dependencies form part of the assistance in decision-
making and taking autonomous actions utilized by many people with 
cognitive disability.  
Connor’s Story 
When Connor Benoit was born, the bleeding wouldn’t stop 
after a blood draw from his heel.  His platelets were dangerously low 
and his spinal fluid wasn’t circulating properly.  The obstetrician told 
Martha and George Benoit they shouldn’t get too close to their son, as 
 
83 ARSTEIN-KERSLAKE, supra note 44, at 62. 
84 Id. at 63.  The late San Francisco State University historian Paul Longmore insisted that 
interdependence is more critical to people with disabilities than independence.  In some 
cultures, the role of (extended) family in decision-making is legally embraced.  For example, 
New Zealand’s determination of eligibility for funded disability support services may involve 
consultation with whānau (Māori) or aiga (Pasifikan) family members to identify support 
needs and available resources, supports, and services.  Disability Support Services, SUPPORT 
OPTIONS, http://www. 
supportoptions.co.nz/support/services.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2019).  The Hawai’i Family 
Court and Child Protective Services has adopted an “ohana conferencing” model which 
“empowers the extended family and uses often-untapped resources and community supports” 
in its child welfare system.  Paul Adams & Susan M. Chandler, Building Partnerships to 
Protect Children, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 503 (2002).  See also Rosenbaum, supra note 59, at 176-
77 (emphasis on person-centered planning can obscure benefits of family input).  Almost two 
decades after passage of the Lanterman Act, the California Legislature adopted a legislative 
intent amendment “recogniz[ing] the ongoing contributions many parents and family members 
make to the support and well-being of their children and relatives with developmental 
disabilities” and directing “that the important nature of these relationships be respected and 
fostered by regional centers and providers of direct services and supports.”  CAL. WELF. & 
INST. CODE § 4620.1.  
85 ARSTEIN-KERSLAKE, supra note 44, at 62-63.  The family-centered approach “modifies 
the view of family members as people who only cause problems and are obstacles to the 
improvement of clients, and it is consistent with the notion of collaboration as a preferred style 
of family-professional interaction.”  Reva I. Allen & Christopher G. Petr, Toward Developing 
Standards and Measurements for Family-Centered Practice in Family Support Programs, in 
REDEFINING FAMILY SUPPORT: INNOVATIONS IN PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP 65 (G.H. 
Singer, L.E. Powers & A.L. Olsen eds., 1996).  
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“he might not last that long.”  A nurse in the neonatal intensive care 
unit had assured them: “We’re going to see what we can do to salvage 
your baby.” As if the memory were still fresh, George later remarked: 
“Salvage—she actually used that word.”  
When he was 3, Connor began to have seizures that caused his 
speech and cognition to deteriorate.  As he grew less articulate, his 
inability to communicate discomfort or distress exacerbated his 
challenging behaviors, which included a chair-throwing episode in a 
restaurant the family frequented.  Teachers felt put upon to have him 
in class, and his middle school administration balked at painting a 
yellow safety stripe, to accommodate his vision impairment, on a set of 
stairs where Connor had fallen.  
The Regional Center eventually provided George and Martha 
with some respite time, and they applied for some IHSS hours, 
including a part-time nurse.  Additionally, the Blind Babies 
Foundation (BBF)86 offered the Benoits vision specialists, connections 
to community services, and a community of other families of children 
with visual impairments.  The family maintains close relationships with 
their BBF counselor and behaviorist, and for several years Martha 
served on the BBF Board. 
Still, George Benoit compares having a child who needs 24-
hour supervision to looking down a dark tunnel that sucks in 
everything you’ve got.  “Whatever you put in, it’s never enough.  But 
you get used to it,” George says.  “Really, there isn’t any other 
option.” 
When he was 22, Connor developed renal failure unrelated to 
his disabilities and started dialysis, for six years at a dialysis center 
and thereafter with a home dialysis program that continues.  In his 
mid-30s, Connor’s condition stabilized and he has not required 
hospitalization for several years.  He walks with the assistance of a 
walker and someone by his side.  While he can sometimes be difficult 
to understand, he communicates reasonably well.  For years, Connor 
accompanied his family every Saturday to a local ranch that offers 
equine therapy for children and adults with disabilities.  He remains a 
 
86 The Blind Babies Foundation provides early intervention and education services to young 
children who are blind or visually impaired and may have additional disabilities.  Its vision 
impairment specialists “collaborate with family members, medical professionals, caregivers 
and teachers” to help “[f]amilies learn to become successful advocates for their children’s 
education and care.”  Blind Babies Foundation, WAYFINDER FAMILY SERVICES, 
https://www.wayfinderfamily.org/program/blind-babies-foundation (last visited Feb. 20, 
2019).  
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Regional Center consumer, continues to IHSS, and SSI, with nursing 
care for 60 hours a week in the family’s home.  Connor lives with his 
parents, and his younger sister recently enrolled in college.  
In-home respite care, a classic Lanterman Act family service, 
is not merely glorified babysitting.  It requires extraordinary skills on 
the part of the caregiver, especially in the case of older youths, who 
need, and want, to be as independent as possible.  Under the legislation, 
parents have a right to a provider who will attend to their child’s basic 
self-help needs, safety, and other activities of daily living usually 
performed by a family member.  By law—and presumably by best 
practice and the natural order of things—respite care is intended to 
avoid out-of-home placement and to preserve family unity as well as 
offer parents time with each other or with their other children.87 
Paul’s Story 
When Paul was born to Victor and Liz Delgado, he was having 
seizures.  The morning after Paul’s birth, the obstetrician repeated 
ominously to Liz: “Everyone did everything they could do.”  Paul was 
diagnosed with static encephalopathy, the same diagnosis given to 
Ashley X.  Liz’s mother spent that first month helping the family, but 
soon they were on their own.  Feeling that she could do nothing to help 
her son compounded Liz’s distress at his prognosis.  She often sat in 
her parked car, crying to herself so as not to alarm her husband. 
No one could tell the family what to expect for the future.  
Victor and Liz heard everything from “He might not ride a bike” to 
“He might be profoundly mentally retarded.”  One doctor told them, 
“Some people call these kids motor morons.”  Paul received physical 
therapy, occupational therapy, and speech/language therapy to work 
on his difficulties with feeding and to provide him with a means of 
alternative augmentative communication (AAC).  He became a 
Regional Center client and the family received respite services.  
The Delgados joined a parent support group facilitated by 
Through the Looking Glass (TLG), a non-profit agency that 
“encourage[s] respectful and empowering services—guided by 
personal disability experience and disability culture—for families that 
have children, parents, or grandparents with disability or medical 
issues.”88  Liz says this group “saved my life and gave me the emotional 
 
87 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 54302(a)(38)(A).  
88 Mission, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, http://www.lookingglass.org/who-we-are/miss 
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tools I needed to cope.”  United Cerebral Palsy matched Liz with a 
parent mentor who provided additional peer-to-peer education and 
gave the Delgados a vision forward. 
Doing battle with schools when Paul was younger, and with 
insurance companies and social services later, consumed an 
inordinate amount of the Delgados’ time.  They had to advocate 
unrelentingly to get their school district to provide adequately for 
Paul’s learning and safety needs.  For example, Paul had an 
instructional aide, but she could not feed him, nor was there any 
private place for his brief to be changed.  Paul’s assistive technology 
required expertise that the school lacked. 
In his early 30s, Paul continues to live with his parents.  Victor 
has been his primary caregiver since Paul was 4 years old, and Liz 
works at a disability rights advocacy organization to support the 
family.  Paul began to receive IHSS and SSI when he turned 18.  The 
Delgados prioritize family time, and while the family stayed close to 
home when Paul was younger, as his extreme spasticity and high tone 
made sitting in a stroller or car seat painful, they now enjoy taking 
long hikes together, made possible once Paul got a properly fit 
motorized chair and they acquired an AAC system and accessible van.  
Paul experienced some serious health setbacks in his late 20s that 
entailed surgery and several hospitalizations.  He has regained health 
and strength over time.  
While American political rhetoric regularly invokes “family 
values,” the reality is that caregiving is a devalued profession, and 
families are on their own to devise ways to manage daily life.  
Moreover, child care and home care are among the poorest paid 
professions, and many older adults and people with disabilities live in 
institutions with only custodial care because they have no family to 
care for them, or their families are unable to provide their care.89  As 
to the status of non-familial carers, support persons, and service 
providers, we acknowledge the universality of support: “None of us 
 
ion (last visited Feb. 20, 2019).  TLG proclaims on its Facebook page: “Services are not 
pathologizing, are strength based, and sensitive to the needs of those served.”  These include 
mental health and developmental services, assistance with adaptive equipment, services for 
transitional age youth, and Head Start program consultations.  The staff, many of whom 
themselves have disabilities, also provide information and referrals.”  Through The Looking 
Glass, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/lookingglass.org/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2019). 
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exercise legal capacity alone or in a vacuum. We take support from 
those around us—our friends, families, experts, and professionals.”90   
Keeping a family member with disability at home should not 
mean filing for bankruptcy, giving up one’s own life aspirations, 
deciding not to have other children, or otherwise reorganizing 
priorities and expectations around caregiving as the family’s central 
activity.91  To make that goal a reality, we need a carefully designed 
and fully funded system of physical and financial supports for families.  
If we maintain that such a system is too expensive or too cumbersome, 
then we need to ask ourselves a simple question: What kind of society 
casts out or reshapes its most vulnerable members?  And, if we believe 
that we don’t want to inhabit such a society, how can we build a world 
in which families do not need to consider the desperate measures 
necessary to alter their children’s anatomy, appearance, and body 
chemistry in order to care for them?  Surely, there is a way to handle 
the dilemma of raising children with complex medical and social needs 
that does not require this invasive last resort.  
VIII. SOCIAL CAREGIVING RECOMMENDATIONS 
Societies bear a collective responsibility to care for those who 
cannot care for themselves, and to assist people with disabilities, from 
birth to beyond the death of their parents.  What should this 
responsibility entail?  What are the optimal ways for making 
caregiving a shared obligation of family and society?  How can we 
support families so that people with care needs can remain in their 
homes and communities?  
Isabella’s Story 
Kayla Jefferson looks out for her family.  When her 
methamphetamine and alcohol-addicted niece gave birth to 4 lb. 
Isabella and couldn’t care for her, Kayla volunteered to take Isabella 
 
90 ARSTEIN-KERSLAKE, supra note 44, at 181 (emphasis added).  
91 See Stephen A. Rosenbaum, When It’s Not Apparent: Some Modest Advice to Parent 
Advocates for Students with Disabilities, 5 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 159 186 n.86 (2001) 
(author took pleasure in construction of Allen Ginsberg Memorial Poetry Garden on vacant 
plot at elementary school where son received special education services).  “Quite apart from 
the intrinsic satisfaction, I was not oblivious to the fact that this allowed me to be seen by the 
principal, teachers and other parents not merely as the (demanding) father of a disabled child, 
but as someone who contributes to the greater good of the school community.”  Id. 
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in, despite the fact that she was already raising her own teenage son, 
who has Asperger’s Syndrome, as well as Isabella’s teenage sister.  
Isabella had a brain malformation, a tethered spinal cord, cysts on her 
spinal cord, scoliosis, torticollis, difficulty swallowing, visual-
perceptual and balance impairments, and global developmental 
delays.  She required a pump to provide her with continuous feeding. 
Through California’s Regional Center system, Isabella 
received physical and occupational therapy, and she had an early 
intervention specialist, a speech/language therapist who worked on 
her swallowing and feeding issues, and a case manager.  But no child 
care center, even those advertised as “inclusive,” would accept 
Isabella.  She had pulled out her feeding tube multiple times, each time 
requiring a return to the hospital.  Kayla resorted to driving Isabella 
90 minutes each way to a day care center run by a relative.  Kayla had 
to take many weeks off work to handle Isabella’s medical care.  She 
didn’t own a home, drove a car on its last legs, and lived from 
paycheck to paycheck.  
By the time she was 5 years old, Isabella had made enormous 
progress.  Nevertheless, some medical issues remained, and she 
continues to have significant cognitive impairments.  Kayla knows how 
precarious Isabella’s health and her family’s stability are.  “I feel like, 
at any point, my life—and Isabella’s!—could completely go off the 
rails.”  
After successful neurosurgery, Isabella was able to be weaned 
off her feeding tube, but she still struggles with intermittent back pain, 
and with trauma—both medical and emotional.  Today, thanks to all 
the services and the specialized instruction she received, Isabella is a 
thriving 12- year-old, attending her local public middle school and 
fully included in 90% of the general education program.  She continues 
to receive mental health support for her PTSD, special education 
through her IEP, and Medicaid benefits.  
Isabella’s birth mother died homeless, with a diagnosis of 
mental illness, on the streets.  Isabella remains very close to her sister, 
a college freshman, and has grown to become a valued member of her 
school and local community, standing up for every underdog with 
empathy and persistence.  She is the poster child for early 
intervention—a funny, resilient and witty young person who refuses to 
accept binary definitions and identifies as gender queer.   
The stories we share here of California families that have raised 
children with significant disabilities represent many different 
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approaches to the challenges such households face, and these families 
have differing beliefs and varying access to resources, both in money 
and in community support.  They have all “made do.”  Some have 
financial resources, others use settlement funds from their child’s birth 
complications.  All navigate the public service labyrinths and obstacle 
courses.  All of them also deploy vast amounts of creativity, 
perseverance, problem solving, patience, and physical and mental 
stamina.  Families whose primary language is not English and those 
with fewer resources have a particularly hard time.  Access hurdles 
become especially high in periods of austerity and belt-tightening.  
Andres’ Story 
For Jorge and Silvia Gomez, the road to parenthood was 
rocky: Silvia experienced five miscarriages before successfully 
delivering Andres.  Ecstatic to have a son after so much heartbreak, 
the new parents didn’t make much of a few early difficulties, such as 
having to feed Andres with a syringe because he had a hard time 
nursing.  Then their pediatrician noticed that Andres’ head wasn’t 
growing proportional to his height and weight. 
The diagnosis was complicated: cortical visual impairment 
and a small visual cortex; microcephaly; a seizure disorder; and 
severe developmental delays.  Jorge and Silvia were terrified they were 
going to lose their little boy.  The doctors predicted that Andres would 
never walk or talk, but assured Jorge and Silva that none of Andres’ 
disabilities were incompatible with life.  As a deeply religious family, 
that was all that the Gomez’ needed to hear.  
At 17 months, Andres started to walk.  Now in his early 20s, 
Andres is playing the guitar and the ukulele, and he is happiest when 
he receives music therapy, provided by the Regional Center.  He wears 
a brief for incontinence and receives medications through a 
gastrostomy tube.  He comes to the kitchen table to communicate he’s 
hungry or thirsty, and Silvia, or someone else, sits in the back seat with 
him in the car when the family travels.  He recently received a 
diagnosis of Lennox-Gastaut Syndrome, a severe form of epilepsy, and 
he is entering a study for a new anti-convulsant. 
The Gomez’ have worked hard to ensure Andres is supported.  
When he was very young, they moved so he could attend a school with 
a well-known special education inclusion program.  Silvia devoted 
herself to learning how to advocate for Andres, and she worked closely 
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with his school.  The Regional Center provides 30 hours of respite and 
nursing care each month, and Medicaid covers his medical co-
payments. 
The Gomez family does most things together.  But, when their 
church said Andres could not take communion, Silvia asked the priest 
how he wanted her to explain to her young boys that Russell could 
learn about Jesus and his message of love, but Andres would be 
excluded.  The family found another church. 
At 22 and out of the public school system, the family had a 
tough time finding a program that could serve Andres’ medical and 
intellectual disabilities.  However, he has transitioned to a 10-person 
community-based adult day program with a 1:1 staffing ratio.  
Andres’s younger brother Russell is a college junior majoring in 
cellular and molecular biology with an emphasis in genetics.  The 
whole family recently took a hiking trip through western state national 
parks; Andres loves to be outdoors.  
 
We return to the question with which we began: Is it necessary 
to alter the body of a child with disabilities in order to raise her in a 
way that fulfills her greatest human potential?  For these 
recommendations, we posit a human rights model of disability that 
assumes the full rights and dignity of all people to be free from stigma 
and from being viewed through a medical-only lens.92  
If we were to follow our core values to their logical conclusion, 
we would base our social policy on several key tenets:  
 Dignity and Integrity: Every human being has value and 
deserves dignity and bodily integrity. 
 Interdependence: When self-determination and autonomy are 
unavailable due to disability and an individual cannot make 
informed choices alone, we should advocate for an ethic of 
interdependence, including family-centered decision-making, 
where appropriate.93  
 Universal Design: A growing area of architectural design 
works on the premise that everything we make or adapt should 
be able to be used by all people, whether or not they have 
impairments.  Social attitudes must change to accept that people 
come with different levels of ability, and that people with 
 
92 See supra notes 55-56. 
93 See supra Part VII.  
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disabilities have much to offer their communities.  The concept 
of universal design also provides a model for other fields, such 
as education.94 
 Societal Systems of Care: The costs to support individuals and 
families who require more support than others must be borne as 
a shared societal obligation.  Under the current scheme, 
disability-related costs are spread rather arbitrarily, between 
private health insurance underwriters, underfunded public 
school districts, and a hodgepodge of local, regional, and state 
agencies providing other services.  The system does not need to 
be siloed in this way.  In the United States, antipathy to paying 
taxes is practically a national character trait.  It will take a huge 
cultural and fiscal shift to reorganize and retool our systems of 
care. 
 Legislative Systems of Care: Laws enacted to protect the rights 
of the most vulnerable must be fully funded.  As a society, we 
espouse the value that we have collective as well as individual 
and family responsibility for those among us who are most 
vulnerable.95  We say we believe in ensuring the safety and well-
being of children, youth and older adults as well as of people 
with disabilities.  In practice, we have never quite measured up.  
IX. CONCLUSION 
“It’s a bitch, having a disabled kid,” George Benoit told us, 
with his characteristic bluntness, and only half joking.  He doesn’t 
 
94 See, e.g., Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Full Sp[]ed Ahead: Expanding the IDEA Idea to Let 
All Students Ride the Same Bus, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 373 (2008). “There is no reason why 
the entitlement to a free appropriate public education should be limited to students in need of 
specialized instruction. . . . Doesn’t every child deserve an individualized learning plan that 
charts a course for obtaining an appropriate education and measuring her progress?”  Id. at 
385.  
95 Here, again, the Swedish model is relevant: The community tradition sees persons with 
an intellectual disability as citizens of society, with a right to welfare and participation in 
community life.  The services to be used by them are the services of other citizens, that is, the 
welfare services used by the general public.  Persons with a disability, their life and support, 
are seen from a citizen perspective in the community tradition.  EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL 
DISABILITY RESEARCH NETWORK, supra note 69, at 55.  See also COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIAN 
GOVERNMENTS, 2010-2020 NATIONAL DISABILITY STRATEGY 47-52 (2011), 
https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/05_2012/national_disability_strategy_2
010_2020.pdf (implementing policy that “[p]eople with disability, their families and carers 
have access to a range of supports to assist them to live independently and actively engage in 
their communities”). 
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exaggerate.  Ellen Zafrani confessed, “No offense to those who see life 
differently, but, no, we were not blessed.”  The early years can be 
utterly devastating, when parents spend their days juggling medical 
appointments, therapies, the needs of their other children, jobs, 
insurance, and financial worries—and often grieving.96  Baffled family 
members and friends don’t know what to do or say or how to help—
and many just disappear.  The dream of parenthood morphs into a 
reality of unexpected diagnoses—or mystery causes—for impairments 
and limitations whose final form may remain unknown for years.  
But what is right might differ from family to family.  It may 
mean bucking pressure from family members or doctors to “put away” 
your child (i.e., placement, or the dreaded “P word” as Michael Zafrani 
dubbed it) and move on.  For some families, like the Zafranis, a small 
community-based group care home may be a good answer.  For others, 
supported living in the community can work well, as it does for Carol.  
For still others, it makes the most sense to keep their disabled son or 
daughter at home as adults, as the Benoits and the Delgados are doing.  
Parents who have the means need to consider setting up a special needs 
trust or other system for when they are no longer able to provide for or 
oversee their child’s care.  Families without resources must try to 
identify and recruit younger people who will be able to care for their 
adult child when they are no longer able to do so themselves. 
The distinctively American ideal of rugged individuality has 
historically meant that unless a family decided to place their child, they 
were on their own to provide full financial and caregiving support, for 
their lifetimes and beyond.  Given deinstitutionalization trends of the 
last several decades, placement is no longer a preferred, or even 
available, option.  Yet, even friends, family members, and neighbors 
and acquaintances may remain unaware of—if not indifferent to—the 
attendant financial, physical, and emotional struggles.  
Congenital illness, birth mishaps, injuries, or disease: all can 
produce disability, and these events can happen to families from any 
socio-economic stratum.  Surely, those who win this random and 
ecumenical lottery should receive assistance.  People with disabilities 
deserve—and have the legal right to—a life as part of a community, 
without having to bankrupt themselves or their families or relocate 
 
96 The duration and typical stages of grief are not necessarily predictable when a parent is 
dealing with a child’s loss of developmental skills or medical needs.  See generally Ken Moses, 
The Impact of Childhood Disability: The Parent’s Struggle, CAL. DEP’T EDUC. (2004), 
http://www.pent.ca.gov/beh/dis/parentstruggle_DK.pdf. 
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somewhere that offers a better educational or social services system.  
We all deserve this. 
Finally, no family should have to take extreme measures to 
alter their child’s body to make it conform to a society that fails to 
recognize the value of the many varieties in which human beings enter, 
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